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Introduction
The problem of evil arises when two
statements are conjoined: (1) “If God
exists, God is omniscient, omnipotent,
and omnibenevolent,” and (2) “evil
exists.” If God is omniscient, then
God must know if evil exists. If God is
omnipotent, then God could eliminate
that evil, given the desire to do so. And
finally, if God is omnibenevolent, then
God must in fact desire to eliminate evil,
or, at the very least, all unnecessary evils.
In order for evil to exist, God would
either have to not know about existent evil
(which is inconsistent with omniscience),
not have the power to remove it (which
is inconsistent with omnipotence), or not
be willing to do so (which is inconsistent
with omni-benevolence). Yet, evil exists.
This seems to imply that God either does
not have the three traditional attributes as
defined or does not exist.1
Arguments from evil exploit the fact
that, supposing God exists, God knows
evil exists, could eliminate it, and should
have the desire to do so, but does not.
The arguments aim to prove that the
existence of evil is grounds for the claim
that God does not exist.2 For the purposes
of this paper, I will focus on moral evils
and alert the reader if I reference an
instance of natural evil.3
There are three traditional ways to
answer the problem of evil: through a
total refutation of the problem, a defense,
or a theodicy.4 A theist putting forth a

total refutation denies that the existence
of evil is grounds for the claim that God
does not exist. In other words, they aim
to prove that God’s existence is not at all
problematic given the existence of evil.
For example, they might argue that God
exists by metaphysical necessity or argue
that evil does not actually exist. A theist
putting forth a defense, on the other hand,
concedes that there are prima facie grounds
for doubting God’s existence given the
existence of evil. However, defenses only
aim to prove the possibility that God could
have justified reasons for allowing evil to
exist. Due to space constraints, this paper
will not discuss specific total refutations or
defenses. It will focus on theodicies.
A proponent of theodicy concedes
that there are prima facie grounds for
doubting God’s existence given the
existence of evil. However, they hold that
any inconsistency can be reconciled by
arguing that there are justified reasons
why God would allow evil to exist. In
section 2, I outline two forms of theodicy:
free will theodicies and soul-making
theodicies. I then present two problems
with these theodicies. In the first place,
they presuppose a conception of God
that is not actually omnibenevolent,
which is self-defeating for a traditional
theistic answer to the problem of evil.
Second, I argue that the individualized
emphasis of the free will and soul-making
theodicies downplays the significance of
communities in the process of overcoming

1. Michael Tooley, “The Problem of Evil,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2015
Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed. accessed July 16, 2015, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/
entries/evil/, Introduction.
2. See Tooley, Section 1.2. It is possible to formulate incompatibility arguments from evil or evidential
arguments from evil. An incompatibility argument is an attempt to prove that conjoining the statements
“God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent” and “evil exists” amounts to a logical contradiction.
An evidential formulation is an attempt to prove that the true statement, “evil exists,” makes God’s
existence extremely unlikely when conjoined with the statement, “God is omnipotent, omniscient, and
omnibenevolent.” Royce’s career antedated the incompatibility/evidential distinction. As such, this paper
will evaluate the traditional answers and Royce’s answer as hypotheses rather than as proofs or probability
analyses.
3. See Todd Calder, “The Concept of Evil,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014
Edition), Edward N. Zalta, ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2014/entries/concept-evil. In the
article, Calder defines natural evils as bad states of affairs which are not caused by the actions or negligence
of a moral agent, using hurricanes and toothaches as examples. Moral evils are bad states of affairs which
are caused by the actions or negligence of a moral agent, such as stealing or declining to inform someone
of imminent danger. The “broad” understanding—encompassing both natural and moral evils—is typically
used in the arguments from evil and responses to them.
4. Tooley, “The Problem of Evil”, Section 4.                              	
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evil. In section 3, I present Royce’s answer
to the problem of evil as found in The
Sources of Religious Insight and The Problem of
Christianity. Afterward, I argue that Royce’s
answer addresses the deficiencies in these
theodicies. Royce’s answer to the problem
of evil is better than the aforementioned
theodicies for two reasons: (1) it does not
presuppose the problematic conception
of God that the theodicies do, and (2)
it adequately emphasizes the role of
community in the process of
overcoming evil.
The Argument From Evil and
Traditional Responses
Recall that arguments from evil exploit
the apparent inconsistency that arises
when supposing the coexistence of God
(as traditionally defined) and evil. The
arguments cite the existence of evil as
grounds for the claim that God does
not exist. However, the existence of evil
supports that claim only if two implicit
claims are true. First, that there are bad
states of affairs which make it prima
facie unreasonable to believe in God’s
existence. Second, that there are no
justified reasons why God would allow the
existence of evil.5 Theodicies accept the
first claim and reject the second. They all
share the presupposition that a world with
evil can be better than a world without
evil, so long as that world also contains
some specific valued good.
Soul-making theodicies presume that
human spiritual development culminating
in the achievement of a spiritual ideal
ordained by God is supremely valuable.
God created human beings for the
expressed purpose of attaining that ideal
and earning the right to dwell with God.6
However, spiritual developmentcomes at
a price. People must endure evil in order
to acquire the character traits necessary
to develop according to God’s plan.
Since God created a world where people
can develop through their struggles with
evil and (at least potentially) achieve the
spiritual ideal, God remains morally
perfect. With this understanding, the
existence of God is consistent with the

existence of evil. Now, we move to free
will theodicies.
Free will theodicies presume that
libertarian free will—when it is used to
worship God and when in accordance
with God’s moral dictates—is supremely
valuable. God created people with free
will so that they could worship and act
morally of their own accord. Though
people misuse their free will and act
immorally, the great value of its proper
use more than justifies the existence of
evil. It follows that God must have created
people with free will in order to create
a morally perfect world and that the
existence of God is not inconsistent with
the existence of evil. It will be beneficial
to consider a hypothetical instance of evil
in order to see how the theodicies function
to answer the problem of evil and then to
highlight the deficiencies.7
Tammy arrives home after working
late one night. The house is dark, and
her family does not seem to be home.
The eerie silence is broken by a phone
call. The caller identifies himself as a
police officer investigating a fatal twocar accident. One driver, it appears,
was Tammy’s husband. There were two
bodies in the back seat. Tammy knows
immediately that the two bodies are those
of her children.
The officer informs her that the other
driver, Matthew, is alive and was rushed to
the hospital. It is likely that Matthew was
driving under the influence of alcohol. For
months, Tammy struggles just to survive.
She is consumed with pain over her loss
and with anger at the man who took her
family from her. Finally, Matthew is well
enough to stand trial. He is sentenced
to 12 years in prison. Going through the
process of the trial only makes Tammy’s
pain worse, and she finds no peace after
the sentencing.
Eventually, one of Tammy’s friends
offers to take her to church. Tammy
has never considered religious belief
rational, and even married a nonbeliever
in order to maintain a thoroughly secular
household. In desperation and knowing

that nothing else has helped her, Tammy
reluctantly agrees to go. After the service,
Tammy speaks with the pastor about her
case. The pastor sympathizes and tells
Tammy of Christ’s atonement for sin and
God’s unimaginable forgiveness. Despite
initial skepticism, Tammy takes the lesson
to heart and works to forgive the man who
killed her family.
After much prayer and spiritual
guidance, Tammy is ready to go to the
prison and openly forgive Matthew.
Tammy finds Matthew a broken man. He
has fallen into self-hatred so deeply that
he feels even prison is too good for him.
He expects to get lambasted by Tammy
for what he has done, and even welcomes
the idea. Tammy, however, offers him her
forgiveness. She tells Matthew of God’s
forgiveness which set her free from hatred
and hopes that Matthew will also find his
way to God. Tammy meets with Matthew
once a month to read Bible verses and
pray, until he is released and devotes his
life to serving God.
A theist interpreting this scenario
by way of a soul-making theodicy would
evaluate Tammy’s state after dealing
with the accident and look for signs of
spiritual development. The accident and
all its attendant evils provided the impetus
for Tammy to strive to become more
forgiving, compassionate, and peaceful.
Tammy learned of God’s forgiveness
of sin and eventually decided to model
herself after that example and forgive
Matthew. In this way, she developed
spiritually and became more like the ideal
person she was created to be, thus getting
closer to achieving her purpose.
An obvious objection to this scenario
is that not all the evils in this case were
beneficial for the purpose of soul-making.
For example, shouldn’t we consider
whether Tammy’s husband and children
developed morally and spiritually given
the events of the scenario? Tammy’s
children died horrifically in a car accident
and don’t seem to have had a chance to
develop any godly character traits from
that. Further, Tammy’s husband was not

5. Ibid., Section 4.
6. René Van Woudenberg, “Chapter 12: A Brief History of Theodicy,” in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, ed. Justin P. McBrayer and Daniel
Howard-Snyder (Somerset, NJ.: John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated 2013), 177.
7. The reader should note that, while this scenario makes use of specifically Christian terminology, the pertinent features of the case are also applicable to soulmaking theodicies and free will theodicies from the Islamic or Judaic perspective.
8. See, for example, David C. Cramer, “John Hick,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: ISSN 2161-0002, http://www.iep.utm.edu/hick, Section 3A.
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a theist. If evil exists to make people into
spiritual beings worthy of communion
with God, it fails to meet that end if
people die without believing in God.
To this, proponents of soul-making
theodicies could argue that spiritual
development does not cease at death.8
People may continue to become
more god-like after death—either by
reincarnation or transfer to another
realm of existence. In this way, Tammy’s
husband and children could still have
opportunities to attain the spiritual ideal
set out for them by God. We will now
move to a free will interpretation of this
scenario.
Recall that theists value libertarian
free will because it is a prerequisite for
freely loving and obeying God. A theist
interpreting this case under the free will
theodicy would evaluate Tammy’s actions
in response to the evils she faced in order
to see how her life improved by making
the right choices. Tammy chose to set
aside her skepticism and seek spiritual
guidance. Then, she extended the love
and forgiveness that she received from her
newfound faith to Matthew. Further, she
chose to help Matthew along his spiritual
journey by meeting with him once a
month. The loss that Tammy suffered
provided the opportunity for her to strive
toward her highest purpose—a life freely
devoted to the service of God.
One could object that Tammy
would not have had to suffer her loss if
God had created a world without free
agents. If God had created righteous
automatons instead of the occasionally
evil individuals that truly exist, Matthew
would never have driven drunk and killed
Tammy’s family. However, this possibility
exchanges the alleviation of suffering
for the possibility of morally meaningful
action. Agents who are determined to
perform good actions are not as valuable
as ones that freely do so. Without the
capacity to choose evil humans could not
be responsible for all the good that they
do, thus lowering their value in the eyes
of God.
The reader has surely noted a

common theme between these two
theodicies. On both views, God
is responsible for the existence of
unnecessary evils. In the case of soulmaking theodicies, God created the world
as it is such that people could develop
virtuous traits (such as mercy, compassion,
and love) by overcoming evils, but some
of these evils are unnecessary for this
purpose. In the case of free will theodicies,
God created human beings with free will
because it is necessary for a morally good
and valuable world, though it often leads
to unnecessary evil and suffering. Let us
return to Tammy’s case to make the point
explicit.
With regard to the soul-making
account, God is responsible for the
suffering required by the developmental
process as it exists now. It may very
well be that Tammy grew spiritually by
undergoing the trials that she did. But if
that is so, it is only because God designed
the world in such a way that suffering
was necessary for her growth. All other
things being equal, a world where people
do not have to suffer to acquire godly
character traits is better than one in which
they must. Being omnipotent, God could
have just as easily designed a soul-making
process that did not involve the experience
of suffering—sparing Tammy the loss of
her family—but chose not to do so. Now,
we will consider the free will account.
If someone had watched Matthew
stumble out of the bar, fumble with his
keys, and proceed to drive away clearly
intoxicated, that person would be held
accountable for not intervening if he were
able to do so. Of course, an omnipotent,
omniscient, and omnipresent God is
perfectly able to intervene whenever and
wherever that God desires. So, even if the
value of free will is granted, God could
ensure that cases of innocent suffering
such as this did not happen. A mere gust
of wind could have set Matthew’s vehicle
on a course that did not intersect with
Tammy’s husband and children, which
would be well within God’s ability to
arrange. Matthew’s poor decision-making

need not have caused suffering in anyone’s
life but his own. A parenting analogy is
sometimes used to characterize the God/
human relationship, in part because of
the inequalities implied but also due to
God’s supposed unconditional love for
human beings. However, it should be clear
from the preceding discussion that the
parenting analogy is critically flawed.
A parent who takes the training
wheels off his child’s bicycle when the
child has had some practice riding is
acting out of love. In an imperfect world,
it is necessary to challenge people in order
for them to develop perseverance and
responsibility. On the other hand, if that
parent had removed the training wheels
and allowed the child to ride in traffic
that would not be an expression of love.
Pushing the child into a busy intersection
to test his reflexes and pain tolerance
would be maniacal.9 The theodicies
propose that God tests the innocent by
letting them suffer at the hands of the
guilty, and purifies their souls through
pain. Those are not expressions of
omnibenevolence. Because of this, neither
a free will theodicy nor a soul-making
theodicy can rescue the traditional
conception of God from the problem of
evil.
Moreover, the theodicies are
inadequate because they frame
overcoming evil as an individual
achievement rather than a communal
one.10 For example, in soul-making
theodicies, an individual overcomes evil by
acquiring the necessary godly character
traits and striving to be the person God
wants her to be. In free will theodicies,
an individual overcomes evil by resisting
temptation and acting in accordance with
God’s will. Salvation is meted out to those
who meet God’s spiritual standards on
an individual basis. The effects that godly
dispositions and actions have on others
are secondary to their status as individual
achievements.
To be clear, neither theodicy takes
a radically individualistic view where
evil is overcome without regard for, or

9. It must also be noted that, in this analogy, the human parent is not indirectly responsible for the existence of bicycles and motor vehicles, nor does he write the
laws of physics that make their engagements tragic.
10. Of course, the foundation for the individualized emphasis in the theodicies is the doctrine of the soul. It is far beyond the scope of this paper to offer a full
argument towards adopting an alternative model of the self against traditional doctrines of the soul. Rather, in this section I will point out that we can give a
conceptually richer account of the role that evil plays in human life by employing a communal framework for interpreting instances of evil, which follows from the
assumption of a relational model of the self.
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at the expense of, others. Soul-making
theodicies, for instance, value mercy as
a godly character trait. This implies an
interpersonal dimension to overcoming
evil because a person can only be
merciful to another person. Rather, these
theodicies are inadequate because they
do not take into account the fundamentally
relational nature of the individuals in
question.
On a communal understanding,
instances of evil primarily serve to
estrange people from one another.
People overcome evil in much the same
way that they do on the individualized
understanding: They acquire character
traits such as compassion, benevolence,
and temperance. The difference is that, on
the communal view, those dispositions and
actions are primarily valuable because
they serve to bring people together into
a community, not only because they are
individual achievements. Let us turn to
Tammy’s case and its theodicy-inspired
readings one last time in order to compare
this communal understanding against the
individualized one.
The theodicy readings posit a
stable core to Tammy that remained
fundamentally unchanged by the loss of
her family. She had the same soul before
and after the loss of her family; otherwise,
it would not be correct to say that Tammy
developed spiritually or that Tammy was
responsible for making the good choices
that she did after the accident. On the
communal reading, when Matthew drove
drunk and killed Tammy’s husband and
children, he not only severed Tammy’s
relationships with her family but also
destroyed a major part of her identity.
Tammy did not develop spiritually
or act morally in a vacuum. She was
a mother, wife, friend, and eventually
a member of a church. In the wake

of disaster, people need psychological,
emotional, and spiritual support from
others, not ample personal fortitude.
Tammy endured her hardships by relying
on the relationship she had with her friend
and forming a relationship with the pastor
of the church. Eventually, she was able
to overcome her hatred, forgive Matthew,
and help him along his own journey to
God. She overcame evil by establishing
beneficial relations with others, which
maintained her spiritual strength and gave
her new opportunities to act in a god-like
fashion.   
The case is not fully explained by
either theodicy reading because they both
miss the cooperative element at work in
it. A network of actors worked to bring
about the reconciliation. That is not to
say that Tammy bore no responsibility
for her actions. After all, they would not
have come about without her. It is simply
to say that the experience of evil and its
overcoming is a communal one as much
as it is an individual one. An answer to the
problem of evil that omits that fact does
so arbitrarily and to its own detriment.
In summary, the traditional answers to
the problem of evil are inadequate. They
imply the existence of a God which does
not escape the problem of evil and they
unduly omit the communal aspect of the
process of overcoming evil. To prefigure
the discussion of the next section, Josiah
Royce’s answer to the problem of evil
does not suffer from these deficiencies.
Royce’s Answer to the
Problem of Evil
Before I discuss Royce’s answer to the
problem of evil, it will be beneficial to
briefly explain how he frames the issue.
The reader should keep in mind that
Royce explicitly rejects the three-omni
conception of God that is presupposed by
the traditional theodicies.11 We will discuss

Royce’s conception of God toward the
end of this section, after the foundation of
Royce’s views on evil has been laid. Royce
understands evil in the typical sense, but
with a pragmatic twist. “Evil” describes
any bad state of affair which serves to
undermine the purposes of a rational
agent.12
While Royce agrees with traditional
monotheists that people exist in a fallen
state, fall short of an ideal life, and need
a savior to achieve that life,13 people are
not evil by nature. They perform evil
actions because they are morally detached
individuals.14 If left unrecognized and
unattended, this detachment leads to a
state called “social blindness,”15 which is
to be irresponsive to the needs of others
and too proud in one’s own strivings to see
the value in conflicting strivings.16 In order
to find the cure for the affliction of social
blindness, let us consider the origin of the
“morally detached individual.”
People are morally individuated in
three ways: by the distinctness of their
experience, the outward inaccessibility
of their thoughts and intentions, and by
the presumption that “deeds and their
doers stand in one-one correspondence,”17
which is to say the presumption that
collective action is merely the sum of
individual actions. Royce argues that
this idea is of recent vintage and is
not supported by experience in daily
life.18 In Royce’s view, a community is a
superhuman being that is composed by,
but is not reducible to, its members and
whose actions are more than the sum of
its individuals’ actions.19 A community
acts in the world through its members, has
a past, and will have a future. Members
are united in the “spirit” of their
community and overcome their social
separation by taking up shared values
and purposes. A community need not

11. Jacquelyn Ann K. Kegley, Josiah Royce in Focus, (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 2008), 80.
12. Josiah Royce, The Sources of Religious Insight, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 216.
13. Ibid., 28-29.
14. Josiah Royce, The Problem of Christianity, (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 194.
15. Ibid., 378.
16. Kegley, Josiah Royce in Focus, 93.
17. Royce, Problem of Christianity, 238.
18. Ibid., 240.
19. Royce, Problem of Christianity, 123.
20. See Chapter 2 of Kegley’s Josiah Royce in Focus for a thorough explication of Royce’s views on the self.
21. Royce, Problem of Christianity, 269. See also: Frank Oppenheim, Royce’s Mature Philosophy of Religion, (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame Press, 1987), 142.
“Higher life” here is meant in two senses. First, in the sense that devotion enriches a person’s life, and, second, in the sense that the person’s life becomes more
attuned to the divine life.
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be heroic to bring its members together;
however, a youth soccer league illustrates
the idea nicely.
Imagine that, some years ago, a
group of parents decided that the local
neighborhood children should have more
opportunities to play and get to know
each other. The parents pitched in to buy
a vacant field and soccer equipment and
started holding games every weekend.
The parents form a community by acting
together for the sake of a shared purpose.
Each member takes the past actions of
the league as events in his or her own
past, and the future actions of the league
into his or her own future. For example,
Bill and Sarah both remember painting
the lines on the field before the very first
game, and look forward to the day that
the league can afford a scoreboard. The
sum of all those shared and anticipated
experiences—and the meanings those
events hold for the members—constitute
the “self ” of the community.20 Yet, not
every community has the same peaceful
existence as the soccer league we have
been discussing. Often, the purposes
of a community are subverted by (or
existentially opposed to) instances of
evil, and members must thwart that evil.
Royce calls people’s practical devotion
to a higher communal life—including
struggling together against evil—
“loyalty,”21 and it is to that concept that
we turn now.
Recall that an instance of evil is
any state of affairs that undermines the
purposes of rational agent. Under this
category, we would do well to include
pain, disease, and pestilence. Finite
beings can only survive within a very
narrow range of acceptable conditions
and are severely limited in their abilities
to maintain those conditions. Because
human beings are so limited in their
individual experience and knowledge
of the world, they form communities to

survive. But, as a matter of course, these
communities create and follow moral
codes that vary widely. The practices of
one community are often considered evil
by another. In order to avoid arbitrariness
in the discussion of evil, we need a
regulative principle that is logically prior
to the moral code of any one community,
but at the same time does not invalidate
those moral codes.
That principle is this: recognize
“the spiritual unity of all the world of
reasonable beings”22 as the true cause of
loyalty. Then, seek to actualize it through
the particular, and necessarily contingent,
causes that make up one’s communal life.
It is necessary and honorable to devote
oneself to one’s community. However,
communities that are rooted in hating
and destroying other communities
are not objects of genuine loyalty. A
community that exists to divide people
from one another does not further the
true cause of loyalty, which is divine in
nature. Communal loyalty, then, is more
than a principle of morality, so long as
it is genuine. For Royce, it is a religious
disposition which serves a dual purpose:
establishing individuals and establishing
communities.23
A community demands the unique
contributions of talented individuals.24
A person cannot properly serve a
community’s cause without establishing
herself as a unique individual, because
she acquires knowledge and skills in the
process.25 I invite the reader to contrast
people working on an assembly line with
a group of medical researchers working to
produce a malaria vaccine. The first social
arrangement is designed to eliminate
individuality through standardization,
making the members more or less
interchangeable. The second is designed
to stimulate the creative problemsolving capacities of the members,
who are experts. Far from being a loss

22. Royce, Sources of Religious Insight, 205. Emphasis removed from the original.
23. Ibid., 357.
24. Ibid., 264.
25. Royce, Sources of Religious Insight, 197.
26. Ibid., 239.
27. Ibid., 252.
28. Ibid., 253.
29. Royce, Problem of Christianity, 180.
30. Ibid. 204.
31. Ibid. 180.
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of individuality, true community is the
guarantor of it.
However, we have so far been treating
evil as something that simply should not
exist. Yet, Royce’s keenest insight into
the experience of evil is perhaps that
this conceit is blatantly false. That seems
counterintuitive. After all, curing 100%
of malaria cases is necessarily better than
curing 99% of malaria cases (assuming,
of course, that eliminating the remainder
did not involve doing anything terribly
imprudent). Still, there are experiences
of evil that no one would wish to remove
from their lives Royce defines those
experiences as sorrows.26
Whether they occur through
conscious separation or accidental death,
the evils that cause the most psychological,
emotional, and spiritual damage are the
losses of loved ones. Supposing that an
unfaithful spouse or a friend-turnedenemy can be forgiven, their actions
cannot be forgotten. Even so, that grief
is not something we would want to be
rid of entirely. One might wish to numb
oneself to the pain if it is unbearable,
but not to the sensitivity that causes the
pain. Spiritual strength is acquired by
recognizing this sensitivity through the
grief and using it to deepen relations with
others.27 The result of that struggle is
sorrow.
In order to recognize the strength that
sorrows offer, it is necessary to take a step
back from the pain of grief and recognize
why it exists. A severed tie between
intimately connected people is the worst
imaginable pain. This, obviously, implies
the capacity to be intimately connected
with someone, which could only be
present in profoundly social beings.
Sorrow’s unsettling prevalence presents
a religious insight. Spiritual strength is
not won by merely avoiding possible
suffering because, in this world, everyone
will have sorrows. Neither one’s world

nor one’s fellows are perfect. Spiritual
strength is won by developing the patience
and courage to face a future full of
meaningful relations without bitterness
and resentment.
With this in mind, the next step
is to endure the hardship. Finally, it is
necessary to draw upon the insight of
sorrow and reinvest oneself in social
reality. One must deepen relationships or
form new ones while remaining aware
that sorrow in the future is guaranteed.
New and renewed loyalty to meaningful
causes are gifts that can only be won
through suffering.28 Of course, the loyalty
of finite beings has its limits.
A member’s betrayal of a community
is an especially painful sorrow and it is
often fatal for the community. The losses
incurred by sorrows are permanent
because the deeds cannot be undone.
Further, any love that the members can
extend to the traitor, or the one who
betrays the community, will be scarred by
the memory of their action. However, the
aftermath of a betrayal is fertile ground
for the creative power of communal
action. Members who are willing to bear
the sorrow and work to reestablish their
community bring about goods that would
have been impossible had the betrayal
not taken place. This is how members
manifest the spirit of their community,
which guides the process of atonement.29
In the Problem of Christianity, Royce
illustrates his idea of atonement through
an interpretation of the Biblical story of
Joseph.30 Joseph’s brothers were jealous
of the preferential treatment he received
from their father and sold Joseph into
slavery. Years later, during a time of
great famine, Joseph’s brothers travelled
to Egypt (where Joseph had become
Pharaoh’s trusted advisor) to buy supplies.
Joseph revealed his identity to his brothers
and sent them back to their father with
ample provisions. In Royce’s view, Joseph
providing for his family was an act
of atonement.
There are three central elements to
Roycean acts of atonement. The first is

that the act is performed by some person
other than the traitor. The second is that
the act would be impossible without the
specific betrayal that it atones for. The
third element is that the act of atonement
makes the world better than it was before
the treason.31 In this case, Joseph could
not have helped his brothers if he were
not sold as a slave. Joseph chose to see
through his grief, endure it, and make
it part of a process of reconciliation.
Coincidence may have brought them
together spatially, but only Joseph’s actions
could have reunited the family spiritually.
Now that the foundation of Royce’s views
has been laid, we can make the divine
thread running through the discussion
explicit.
Recall that, for Royce, a community
is a superhuman being. As such,
communities can be afflicted by a kind
of social blindness like the one which
we discussed at the beginning of the
section. When members set out to do
things on behalf of their community,
they are expressing love for one another
and for that being that unites them.32
However, the love of a community can
itself become a stumbling block on the
path towards creating more inclusive
communities. The horrors that malevolent
communities have inflicted upon the
world throughout history need not be
regaled here. Suffice to say that people
are in constant danger of allowing the
love they have for their community to
become obsessive and exclusionary.33
This happens when they mistake their
finite, fallible community for the highest
good. In Royce’s view there is an actual
highest good. That highest good is the
Spirit of the Universal Community, which
functions in Royce’s religion of loyalty like
the God of monotheism functions in those
religions.
The Spirit is the divine being that
calls upon individuals to conquer evil
by exercising their loyal devotion to
communities, including through atoning
deeds. People are receptive to the will of

the Spirit and learn to feel the difference
between communal love and the evil
of hatred.34 The social sensitivity that
allows people to look beyond their narrow
self-interest and band together into
finite communities is the first hint of the
ideal that is the Universal Community.
Members have a duty to stay vigilant
against encroaching blindness and ensure
that their finite communities remain
inclusive, uplifting, and faithful to the
Spirit of the Universal Community.
Individuals and communities are
engaged in the temporal, yet endless task
of overcoming evil. The task is temporal
because it takes place within the processes
of the world, as the Spirit overcomes evil
step by step through the triumphs of its
members. The task is endless because,
while individuals can work towards
actualizing the ideal of the Universal
Community, they will necessarily fail.
So long as there are finite beings, there
will be conflict and evil. The claim that
every instance of evil will be met with its
fitting act of atonement cannot be proven.
Rather, it is asserted by all those who act
as if it were true and strive to bring lasting
peace to a hurting world.35
Unlike the traditional conception
of God, the Spirit of the Universal
Community does not create the world
but expresses itself through the existing
processes of the world.36 This means
that the Spirit cannot conceivably bear
responsibility for the existence of evil.
Further, while the traditional conception
of God allows evil to exist to suit its own
salvific tastes, the entire aim of the Spirit
is to overcome evil by bringing finite
beings together in community.
This leads us straight away to the
individualistic emphasis of the traditional
theodicies, which I argue is their second
deficiency. Royce’s answer to the problem
of evil stresses the interconnectedness of
individuals and the fact that reconciling
evil is a communal process. People depend
on one another for the strength and
means to persevere against evil, so it is

32. Ibid. 265.
33. Kegley, Josiah Royce in Focus, 93.
34. Oppenheim, Royce’s Mature Philosophy of Religion, 142.
35. Royce, Problem of Christianity, 186.
36. See Kegley, Josiah Royce in Focus, 157-8. For a brief summary of Royce’s views on the monotheistic
doctrine of creation.
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only fitting that they should overcome evil
together as well. In conclusion, Royce’s
conception of God does not fall prey
to the problem of evil, and he offers
a communal model for the process of
overcoming evil. For these reasons, the
answer to the problem of evil that Josiah
Royce proposes in his later writings is
better than the traditional theodicies we
have been discussing.
Conclusion
In this paper, I introduced the problem
of evil and two traditional answers to
that problem: soul-making theodicies
and free will theodicies. After outlining
the theodicies, I used them to interpret a
hypothetical scenario. Using that scenario
and evaluating how proponents of soulmaking theodicies and free will theodicies
would interpret it, I argued that the
theodicies failed to answer the problem
of evil adequately for two reasons.
Firstly, they presuppose a conception
of God that is not omnibenevolent,
which is self-defeating for a traditionally
theistic theodicy. Secondly, they omit
the communal aspect of the process of
overcoming evil. Then, I explicated the
answer to the problem of evil as found in
Josiah Royce’s later writings, The Sources
of Religious Insight and The Problem of
Christianity. I argued that Josiah Royce’s
answer is superior to the answers given
by traditional theodicies because it does
not presuppose a problematic traditional
conception of God. Also, it adequately
emphasizes the communal aspect of the
process of overcoming evil.
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